Loyola University Chicago International Law Review
Volume 1
Issue 1 Fall/Winter 2003-2004

Article 9

2003

Nuclear Diplomacy: Negotiating Peace on the
Korean Peninsula
Peter Sokgu Yuh
Loyola University Chicago, School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lucilr
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Peter Sokgu Yuh Nuclear Diplomacy: Negotiating Peace on the Korean Peninsula, 1 Loy. U. Chi. Int'l L. Rev. 103 (2003).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lucilr/vol1/iss1/9

This Student Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago
International Law Review by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY:
NEGOTIATING PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA
by Peter Sokgu Yuht

Introduction
North Korea's admission in the fall of 2002 that it has an active nuclear
program, in direct violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework Between the United
States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea' and the 1992
North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula
Agreement, 2 stunned the world. North Korea's open pursuit of nuclear weapons
has the potential to quickly and permanently destabilize the security situation in
East Asia and beyond. North Korea's bald admission that it is seeking nuclear
weapons requires the United States, its allies and the entire world to quickly
develop ways to work with North Korea towards a peaceful agreement.
Although North Korea's admission looked like an obvious violation on its face,
the United States' actions prior to the admission may have first violated the
terms of the treaties between the two countries, thus releasing North Korea from
the treaties. As accusations fly between the United States and North Korea as to
who violated the agreements first, it is clear that this crisis on the Korean
peninsula must be resolved through constructive negotiation rather than military
action.
This paper asserts that had the United States lived up to its promises in the
1994 Agreed Framework, the present nuclear crisis could have been avoided
altogether. Furthermore, North Korea's actions must be viewed objectively and
recognized as rational under the circumstances. Considering the real threat of
attack by the United States, North Korea's decision to develop nuclear weapons
is logical. Initially, the 1994 Agreed Framework defused an impending nuclear
crisis and was seen by many as a masterful work of diplomacy in action. A
decade later, the same problems linger. This nuclear crisis is another
opportunity to bring a lasting diplomatic solution to the problems on the Korean
peninsula.

t Mr. Yuh is a Juris Doctor candidate at Loyola University Chicago School of Law, 2005.
See Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, October 24, 1994, N. Korea - US, 34 I.L.M. 603 [hereinafter 1994 Agreed
Framework].
2 See Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, January
20, 1992, N. Korea - S. Korea, 33 I.L.M. 569 [hereinafter Joint North-South Declaration].
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United States' Introduction of Nuclear Weapons to the Korean Peninsula
Soon after the Korean War ended, the United States introduced nuclear
weapons to the Korean peninsula in spite of an armistice agreement, which
prohibited the introduction of qualitatively new weaponry into the Korean
theater. ' United States policy makers, such as Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles, rationalized that both North and South Korea would think twice before
starting a war that would "rain nuclear destruction. ' 4 Thus, by the mid-1960s,
the United States introduced nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula-an
action it justified under a deterrence theory.5 This action directly violated the
Military Armistice in Korea and Temporary Supplemental Agreement of 1953,
which clearly prohibited both parties from introducing new weaponry into the
Korean theater. 6 The United States defense strategy in the Korean peninsula
centered on routine plans to use nuclear weapons very early in any new war.7 In
fact, in 1991, a high-level former commander of United States' forces in Korea
gave an off-the-record presentation of United States strategy as it had developed
by the 1980s, stating that the United States planned to use tactical nuclear
weapons in the very early stages of a new Korean conflict.8 He further stated that
enhanced radiation weapons might also be used to kill the enemy but save the
buildings if North Korean forces occupied Seoul. 9 In light of these actions by the
United States, North Korea's desire to develop nuclear weapons may be seen as
a reaction to mounting pressures from the United States.' Indeed, in its talks
with the United States, North Korea has expressed a profound fear of United
States aggression.1
The Bush administration presently faces many of the same problems that
confronted the Clinton administration in 1993 and 1994. In May 1994, facing a
huge energy crisis and economic insolvency, North Korea removed some 8,000
fuel rods from a key reactor and placed them in a cooling pond without the
presence of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency
3 See Military Armistice in Korea and Temporary Supplemental Agreement, July 27, 1953, 4
U.S.T. 234 [hereinafter Armistice Agreement].
4 BRUCE CUMINGS, KOREA'S PLACE IN THE SUN: A MODERN HISTORY
479 (1997).

5 Id. Deterrence theory is the prevention of another's unwanted actions by wielding the threat of
undesirable consequences if he decides to proceed. The basis of deterrence theory is the idea that a
potential aggressor would suffer too many losses to make the initiation of hostilities worthwhile.
For example, during the Cold War, the build up of weapons of mass destruction on both sides was
part of each actors' policy choices based on deterrence theory. For any deterrence theory to work,
the consequences must be credible and assumes that both parties are rational actors.
6 Id. at 477.

7 Id. at 480.
9 Id.
9 Id.
10

Id.
Id.
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(hereinafter "IAEA").12 North Korea argued that it had to reprocess the fuel into3
plutonium, a key element in a nuclear weapon, or risk a serious accident.'
Meanwhile, Washington insisted that the rods be disposed of in such a way that
would not enhance the country's ability to build a nuclear bomb. 14 Others
believed North Korea was again returning to old bargaining tactics to leverage
more economic aid for its struggling economy. 15 The United States and its allies
feared that North Korea was diverting materials from the reactor to a weapons
program, and they threatened to impose economic sanctions.1 6 They even
considered military action to force North Korea to readmit international
inspectors.I

Instead of using military action, the United States successfully negotiated a
treaty to defuse a crisis and to help bring stability to the region. 18 When North
Korea agreed to the 1994 Agreed Framework, it was hailed by the Clinton
Administration as a major diplomatic breakthrough.' 9 For once, "the United
States used deft diplomacy to defuse a Korean crisis, instead of sending a
hailstorm of B-52s, F-4 Phantoms, aircraft carriers, and troop alerts to face down
Kim I1 Sung, as all previous presidents had done., 20 As a result of this
agreement, the policy of the United States towards North Korea shifted from one
of containment and isolation to engagement and reconciliation.2' Indeed,
President Clinton lessened the longstanding United States economic embargo by
June of 2000, which was followed by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's
historic visit in late October of 2000.2
The 1994 Agreed Framework
The United States and North Korea signed
2 3 the 1994 Agreed Framework on
October 21, 1994 in Geneva, Switzerland.- The treaty was designed to end
12 Jim

Lobe, US - North Korea: US Sets Datefor Talks on Diplomatic Ties, (October 17, 2002)

Inter Press Global Information Network.
13Id.
14Id.

IsNorthern Exposure; Pyongyang's Nuclear Effort Challenges US Policy Makers, but What

PromptedIt? The Seattle Times, Oct. 24, 2002 at A3 [hereinafter Northern Exposure].
16James Dao, The Pact the KoreansFlouted, N.Y. Times, October 17, 2002.
17Id.

18CUMINGS, supra note 4, at 485.
19Id.
20 Id. at 484.
21Id.

22Bruce Cumings, Stay the Course in Asia, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 57,
Issue 1
(Jan. 1, 2001).
231994 Agreed Framework, supra note 1. Robert L. Gallucci, who at the time was Head of the
Delegation to North Korea and Ambassador at Large for the United States, signed the 1994 Agreed
Framework. Gallucci is now Dean of Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of
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nuclear proliferation in the Korean peninsula and open the door to investments in
impoverished North Korea through a consortium of nations (including the
United States, South Korea, and Japan) called the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO). ' Under the 1994 bilateral accord, North
Korea agreed to suspend operation of nuclear reactors capable of producing
weapons-grade material and to place plutonium already produced under
international safeguards.25 In return, the United States agreed, among other
things, to supply North Korea with regular shipments of fuel oil to serve as an
26
alternative to nuclear power.
The main provisions of the 1994 Agreed Framework stipulate that North
Korea's graphite-moderated reactors would be replaced with light-water reactors
(LWR), both parties would move towards full normalization of political and
economic relations, and both parties would work together for peace and security
on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.2 ' The 1994 Agreed Framework also
provided that, in addition to light water reactors, regular deliveries of heavy oil
would be made to offset the effects of North Korea's energy crisis. 28 Pursuant to
the 1994 Agreed Framework, the United States promised to end hostile relations
and normalize diplomatic and economic ties.2 9 Economic and political
normalization were key provisions for the cash strapped North Koreans, who
were dependent on foreign aid. 30 Thus, the main provisions of the 1994 Agreed
Framework were meant to satisfy North Korea's need for foreign aid while
maintaining peace and security in the region by removing North Korea's ability

Foreign Service. See http://data.georgetown.edu/sfs/bsfs/index.cfm?Target-UAP&Action=View&
Source=Deans&UNum=7 (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
24 Karen DeYoung, US Might Try to Salvage Part of N. Korean Accord, WASH. POST,
October
25, 2002 at A26.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27

1994 Agreed Framework, supra note 1. Specifically, the treaty provides: 1) Both sides will

cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water
reactor (LWR) power plants; 2) The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and
economic relations; 3) Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free
Korean peninsula; and 4) Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nonproliferation regime.
28 1994 Agreed Framework, supra note 1. Specifically, the 1994 Agreed Framework
clearly
stipulates: "In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the US President, the
US, representing the consortium, will make arrangements to offset the energy foregone due to the
freeze of the DPRK's (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) graphite-moderated reactors and
related facilities, pending completion of the first light water reactor unit. Alternative energy will be
provided in the form of heavy oil for heating and electricity production. Deliveries of heavy oil
will begin within three months of the date of this Document and will reach a rate of 500,000 tons
annually, in accordance with an agreed schedule of deliveries."
29 1994 Agreed Framework, supra note 1, states, "The two sides will move towards full
normalization of political and economic relations."
30 DeYoung, supra note
24.
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to produce nuclear weapons. 3'
Broken Promises
North Korea's recent admission of an active nuclear weapons program on its
face suggests a violation of international agreements. 32 Richard Boucher,
spokesman for the United States Department of State, recently stated in a press
release, "North Korea's secret nuclear weapons program is a serious violation of
North Korea's commitments under the Agreed Framework, as well as under the
Nonproliferation Treaty, its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards
agreement, and the Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula., 33 Pursuant to the Joint North-South Declaration on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula signed January 20, 1992 by both
North and South Korea, North Korea's development of a uranium enrichment
facility would constitute a violation of this agreement.3 4
If the newly disclosed program includes a nuclear facility, it would constitute
a violation pursuant to the Safeguards Agreement between the International
Atomic Energy Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPKR,
a.k.a. North Korea). This agreement, signed January 30, 1992 in Vienna, Austria,
states that North Korea must disclose any nuclear activity to IAEA inspectors.3 5
In particular, Article 42 states:
"Design information in respect of existing facilities shall be provided to the
Agency during the discussion of the Subsidiary Arrangements. The time limits for
the provision of design information in respect of the new facilities shall be
specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements
and such information
shall
be procided
facility."
into a new
as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced
North Korea violated Article 42 of this treaty by not disclosing its nuclear
activities. 37 Additionally, it failed to place them under IAEA safeguards, which
is a violation because, pursuant to Sections 71-82 of the Safeguards Treaty,
North Korea has an obligation to allow the IAEA to inspect all nuclear

31Id.

Northern Exposure, supra note 15.
33Richard Boucher, US Department of State, Press Statement, North Korean Nuclear Program,
Oct. 16, 2002, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/14432.htm(last visited Oct. 15,
2003).
Joint North-South Declaration, supra note 2. See Clause 2, which states, "The South and the
North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities."
35Agreement for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Non-proliferation
of
Nuclear Weapons,
32

January 30,1992, N. Korea - I.A.E.A., 33 I.L.M. 315 [hereinafter Safeguards Agreement].
36Id., see Article 42 of the Safeguards Agreement.
37Id.
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facilities.3 8 As the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency stated on
October 17, 2002, "the existence of any nuclear facility should be declared by
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and placed under IAEA
safeguards., 39 As the international regulatory agency responsible for the
monitoring of nuclear energy usage, the IAEA has a responsibility to make
certain that North Korea is using its nuclear resources strictly for energy
purposes and not weapons production.40
North Korea also violated the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, which, in part, prohibits the development and transfer of nuclear
weapons and devices. North Korea's declaration that it is developing nuclear
weapons is in direct violation of Article II of this treatyr, which provides that
North Korea shall not manufacture nuclear weapons.4 Furthermore, United
States intelligence reports indicate that North Korea received critical nuclear
technology from Pakistan, although Pakistan Embassy officials deny this
claim.43 The United States alleges that "the equipment, which may include gas
centrifuges used to create weapons-grade uranium, appears to have been part of a
barter deal beginning in the late 1990s in which North Korea supplied Pakistan
with missiles it could use to counter India's nuclear arsenal."" Trading missiles
for technology that would in any way aid the development of a nuclear program
is in direct violation of Article II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 4 In part, it
states that:
"Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the
transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or
indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the

see Articles 71-81 of the Safeguards Agreement. In particular, Article 71 states: "The
Agency may make ad hoe inspections in order to: (a) verify the information contained in the initial
report on the nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement; (b) identify and verify
changes in the situation which have occurred since the date of the initial report; and (c) identify,
and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, nuclear material in accordance with Articles
93 and 96, before its transfer out of or upon its transfer into the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea."
39Michael Adler, "IAEA Concerned About Report on North Korea Nuclear Program,"
Agence
France-Presse, Oct. 17, 2002.
40See generally Safeguards Agreement, supra
note 35.
41 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed July 1, 1968, 7 I.L.M. 809. North
38Id.,

Korea acceded on April 19, 1985 [hereinafter Non-Proliferation Treaty].
42 Id.
43 David E. Sanger and James Dao, U.S. Says Pakistan Gave Technology to
North Korea, N.Y.
TIMES, October 18, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/18/intemational/asia/
18KORE.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
4Id.

45See

Safeguards Agreement, supra note 35.

International Law Review

Volume I, Issue I

Nuclear Diplomacy
46
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

North Korea's failure to declare the existence of a nuclear weapons program

to the IAEA constitutes a violation of its Safeguards Agreement. 47 Additionally,
North Korea is also in violation of Article III, Section 1 of the Treaty on NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which prohibits the diversion of nuclear

energy from peaceful
compliance with the
that employs uranium
Treaty, 9 as long as

uses to nuclear weapons and requires that all parties be in
IAEA.48 However, although a nuclear weapons program
enrichment constitutes a violation of the Non-Proliferation
North Korea remains a party to this treaty, uranium

enrichment is not in violation of Article IV, Section 1 of the 1994 Agreed
Framework. 50 Article IV, Section I of the 1994 Agreed Framework requires

North Korea to remain a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and pursuant to
which all safeguards shall be implemented, but does not specifically state that
North Korea may not pursue uranium enrichment per se. 51 No clause in the 1994
Agreed Framework considers the production of highly enriched uranium in
North Korea a violation pursuant to the 1994 Agreed Framework.5 2 However,
the failure to have this facility under IAEA inspection constitutes a violation of
Article IV, Section 2, which requires the inspection of all nuclear facilities by the
IAEA.53

The View from North Korea
From the perspective of North Korea, "the United States has repeatedly
broken agreements, harbor[ed] ideas of attacking it and inexplicably refuse[d] to
even talk to a government desperate for better ties."54 Even KEDO officials (the
international consortium created as part of this agreement) concede that
Washington failed to deliver on its promises.55 Charles Kartman, executive
46Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 41.
47Id.
48Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note
41.
49Id.
soId.
51 1994 Agreed Framework, supra note 1. Article IV, Section 1 of the 1994 Agreed Framework
specifically states, "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea will remain a party to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and will allow implementation of its safeguards
under the Treaty."
52 1994 Agreed Framework, supra note 1.
53Id. Article IV, Section 2 of the 1994 Agreed Framework states, "Upon conclusion of the
supply contract for the provision of the LWR (light-water reactor) project, ad hoc and routine
inspections will resume under the DPRK's safeguards agreement with the IAEA with respect to the
facilities not subject to the freeze. Pending conclusion of the supply contract, inspections required
by the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards will continue at the facilities not subject to the
freeze."
54Northern Exposure, supra note 15.
55Doug Struck, For North Korea, US is Violator of Accords; Mind-Set Helps Explain
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director of KEDO, admits "the internal logic of the agreement was that there had
to be progress in terms of improved relations." 56 Indeed, United States State
Department envoy James Kelly's October 2002 trip to Pyongyang, whereby
North Korea announced to the world that they were manufacturing weapons
grade nuclear material, marked the first high-level talks between the United
States and North Korean officials since President Bush took office.5 7 Adding to
the tensions, North Korea contends that George Bush's inclusion of North Korea
with Iran and Iraq in an "axis of evil" 58 effectively nullified the 1994 Agreed
Framework, and, therefore, North Korea had the right to build a weapon "more
powerful than a nuclear weapon based on enriched uranium."'5 9
Professor Bruce Cumings of the University of Chicago, opines that in the case
of nuclear weapons, the law is on the side of North Korea. 60 The NonProliferation Treaty that North Korea adhered to in 1987 gives to nations
threatened by nuclear weapons the sovereign right to possess their own.61 In
accordance with the 1994 Framework, the United States was obligated to extend
formal assurances to North Korea against the threat or use of nuclear weapons.6 2
The treaty clearly states "the US will provide formal assurances to the DPRK,
against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the US." 6 3 From the perspective
of North Korea, the "axis of evil" language used by George Bush coupled with
United States' willingness to send its troops to far away places such as Iraq and
Afghanistan, evidences a hostile and threatening tenor that is in contradiction
with the terms of the 1994 Framework. 64 Moving beyond the rhetoric, the United
States fought a war against North Korea from 1950 to 1953, and maintains one
of its largest military contingents of troops assembled and ready for war on the
Korean Demilitarized Zone. Additionally, because the North Koreans captured
a United States spy ship in 1968, the United States still positions its spy satellites
so that North Korea is constantly in foCUS. 66 These actions by the United States

Pyongyang'sActions, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2002, at A 18.
56

Id.

57 David Sands, N. Korea Breaks Its Promises on Nukes; White House Says It Was
Told of Work,
WASH. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2002, at Al.
58 Julia Preston and David Sanger, North Korea Makes Demand, DESERET NEWS, Oct. 26, 2002,
at Al.
59Id.
60 See generally CUMINGS supra notes 4 and
22.
61

Id.

62

Pyongyang Cannot Expect Any Favours,STRAITS TIMES, Oct. 25, 2002.

63

1994 Agreed Framework, supra note 1.

Id.; Northern Exposure, supra note 15.
supra notes 4 and 22.
6 Id.
65 See generally CUMINGS
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support North Korea's fear of imminent attack.67
Furthermore, North Korea maintains that the United States has failed to
follow through with promised economic benefits that were supposed to be the
compensation for North Korea's agreement to halt its nuclear research.6 8 KEDO
is obligated under the pact to construct two new light water reactor power plants,
from which weapons-grade uranium is difficult to extract, in return for North
Korea's suspension of plutonium production. 69 The first plant was to be
delivered sometime in 2003, but the United States' opposition to the project has
experts predicting that the project is at least six years from completion.7 °
North Korea also charges that the United States has failed to deliver the
500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil that it agreed to deliver annually under the pact.71
In fact, as of 1996, the United States Congress had only agreed to pay $19
million of the estimated $50 million required to fulfill the terms of the
agreement.72 The United States admitted to shipping problems and looked to
South Korea and Japan for additional assistance. In response to the oil
shipment problems, Masao Okonogi, a professor and expert on Korean affairs at
Tokyo's Keio University, said, "There is no option but for someone to pay for
the oil. If the shipments are disrupted, it would be a breach of promise and North
Korea would react harshly., 74 According to North Korean officials, United
States' breaches of the promises have helped create a drastic energy crisis in the
country.75 The failure by the United States to deliver on its promises in
accordance with the terms of the 1994 Treaty has put tremendous economic and
political pressure on North Korea.76
Despite the United States' opening of telephone lines with Pyongyang in
1995, and permitting North Korea to export magnetite to the United States,
North Korea still suffers under economic sanctions.77 The 1994 Agreed
Framework clearly provides specific language calling for the normalization of

67Northern Exposure, supra note 15.
68 Cameron W. Barr, US Rattle a Tin Cup at Allies to Pay
for Oil Due N. Korea: Federal
Shutdown Set Back Plan to Wean Pyongyang off Nuclear Project, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb.

8, 1996, at 6.
69 Id.
70Id.
71 Id.

72 Id.

73Id.
74Id.
75Struck, supra note 55.
76 Id.

77Id.
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political and economic sanctions within certain time limits. 78 In spite of United
States' promises, tangible measures, such as removing the freeze on North
Korean assets in the United States have not materialized. 79 Furthermore, US
banks still do not allow credit card transactions in North Korea. 80 For these
reasons, North Korea maintains that the United States' failure to lift economic
sanctions and work towards full normalization violates Article II, Section 1 of
the 1994 AFreed Framework, which calls for movement towards normalization
of relations.
From this perspective, one can understand why North Korea is tired of
waiting for the United States to honor its promises and instead has resumed its
nuclear program in apparent violation of the 1994 Agreement. 82 Presumably,
North Korea admitted to its nuclear weapons program with the assumption that
the United States had already breached their agreement. Article 60 of the Vienna
Convention, which deals with "the rules of release" from treaties, states that a
"material breach of a bilateral treaty is both necessary and sufficient to give the
victim of that breach the option to release itself from all of its obligations under
the breached treaty., 83 Thus, it can be said that North Korea breached the treaty
with the assumption that because the United States failed to deliver on its
promises in accordance with the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework, North
Korea was discharged of its obligations. This failure by the United States has
been construed by North Korea as an unequivocal manifestation of an
unwillingness to perform in accordance with the terms of the 1994 Agreed
Framework.8 4 For these reasons, North Korea believes that the United States
committed material breaches of the 1994 Agreed Framework, thus releasing
them from their obligations under the treaty and justifying their admission of a
nuclear weapons program.
Negotiating Peace
Considering North Korea's history of negotiating for foreign aid supplements
to bolster its failing domestic economy, North Korea's admission may be

791994 Agreed Framework, supra note 1. Article II, Section 1, stipulates, "Both sides will work
towards normalization of political and economic relations and within three months of the date of
this Document. Both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on
telecommunications services and financial transactions."
79Full Implementation of the US-NK Nuclear Pact Uncertain,KOREA TIMES, July 20, 1998.
80

Id.

811994 Agreed Framework, supra note 1.
82Northern Exposure, supra note 15.
83John K. Setear, Response to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations
Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State

Responsibility, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1997).
84Northern Exposure, supra note 15.
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interpreted as a demand for the Bush Administration to take it more seriously. 5
Toshimitsu Shegemura, a professor of international relations at Takushoku
University, is of the opinion that "North Korea admitted to the program because
it wants the United States to come to the negotiating table and set a path to
improve relations. 86 Ironically, North Korea may actually be trying to improve
relations with the United States by raising the issue of nuclear weapons after
being neglected for two years by the United States. Although crude in its
strategy, North Korea's development of nuclear weapons may be seen in the
context of a country frantically hoping for the resumption of dialogue. Desperate
for continued economic aid, North Korea can be seen as using its nuclear
program to leverage foreign aid to stabilize its economy and also initiate some
much needed reforms. 87 In fact, during Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's
visit to North Korea at the end of the Clinton Administration, Kim Jong I1, the
leader of North Korea, confided that he had been looking at Sweden as an
economic model for reforms to North Korea's economy. 88 North Korea's
methods leave much to be desired, but its past examples of quid pro quo
negotiations for foreign aid lead observers89 to believe that it simply wants
economic aid to stabilize its ailing economy.
The North Koreans have repeatedly expressed their willingness to negotiate
with the United States. 90 Ambassador Han Song Ryol of the Mission to the
United Nations, the country's sole diplomatic post in the United States, said in a
statement, "Everything will be negotiable. Our government will resolve all
United States security concerns through the talks, if your government has a will
to end its hostile policy." 91 There seems to be a strong willingness on the part of
North Korea to negotiate with the United States. Han, when asked if North
Korea is willing to shut down its uranium enrichment program, replied, "Yes, I
believe our government will resolve all US security concerns. Furthermore, in
a press conference regarding North Korea's admission of nuclear weapons
capabilities, Kelly, US State Department envoy to North Korea, reported that
North Korea is willing to shut down its nuclear reactors.93 He said:
"The conditions North Korea offered included a guarantee of no US pre-emptive
attack, recognition of the North Korean government and the signing ofa US-North
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 North NuclearAdmission

Puts Bush in Tight Spot, INTER PRESS SERV., Oct. 17, 2002.

Id.
89 Struck, supra note 55.
88

90 Philip Shenon, North Korea Says Nuclear Program Can Be Negotiated,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,

2002, at Al.
9,

Id.

92

Id.

93 Struck, supra note 55. James Kelly is also the Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific
Affairs for the US State Department.
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Korean peace treaty. The third condition was the signing of a peace treaty with
o N'orth Korea's founder, Kim I1Sung, and his son,
North Korea, a long-held goalII."the current leader, Kim Jong
However, the United States continues to refuse to negotiate with North Korea
and is instead stepping up pressures to further isolate North Korea with
economic sanctions through its allies. 95 Indeed, the recent decision to suspend all
further oil shipments to North Korea is consistent with United States foreign
policy of applying economic pressure to North Korea. 96 The United States also
continues to demand that North Korea first dismantle its nuclear weapons
program before any negotiations commence rather than simply opening a
channel for negotiations.
According to Anthony Lake and Robert Gallucci, this leaves the United States
with essentially the same four options it had in 1994.98 The United States could
"launch a military strike against the identified nuclear facilities; refuse
negotiations and go to the United Nations for sanctions to isolate and contain the
North's nuclear program; essentially accept the new nuclear weapons status of
North Korea and try to contain the damage to international nonproliferation
efforts, as well as to our alliances with South Korea and Japan; or could
negotiate with the North to stop the nuclear weapons program that creates the
crisis." 99 Considering North Korea's admitted willingness to negotiate a hard

line approach (i.e. military action) by the United States may prove disastrous." °
Kangdon Oh, a specialist on North Korea affairs, speculates that if the United
States preemptively attacked suspected North Korean nuclear facilities, North
Korea would respond by "shooting artillery toward South Korea and missiles
toward Japan."' 0 ' Therefore, immediate negotiation and diplomacy by the United
States would be a far better option than the use of military force to resolve this
brewing crisis.
Conclusion
The policy of constructive engagement might have successfully ended North
Korea's plans to develop nuclear weapons if the United States had lived up to its

94Id.

95Don Kirk, Korea Leader Backs Plan to Block Oil to the North, N.Y. TIMES, November 16,

2002, at A11.
96 Id.
97Id.

98Anthony Lake and Robert Gallucci, Negotiating with Nuclear North Korea, WASH. POST,
Nov. 6, 2002, at A21.
99Id.
100Nicholas D. Kristof, Hold Your Nose and Negotiate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at A39.
01
1d. Kangdon Oh is an Asian analyst at the Institute for Defense Analysis in Alexandria, VA.
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promises under the 1994 Agreed Framework Agreement. 102 The opportunity for
diplomacy has presented itself in the form of a brewing nuclear crisis. Rather
than resort to isolationist techniques that increase the stress levels in North
Korea, now is the time for the United States to pursue meaningful dialogue in
pursuit of an end to this crisis. The United States should work with North Korea
to reaffirm the 1994 Agreed Framework and promptly begin dialogue without
prerequisites or contingencies. Hard line measures such as cutting oil supply
shipments will only exacerbate an already serious economic situation in North
Korea, which will lead to further instability. South Korea, Japan, the United
States, and other countries should cooperate for humanitarian support and
exchange, rather than pursue policies of isolation. Through successful
diplomacy, this crisis may be resolved and lay the groundwork for future
peaceful reforms in the region. The United States, as a world leader, has a
responsibility to manage its global power with sensible diplomacy. This latest
nuclear crisis is an opportunity for the United States to show leadership through
heal the wounds of a peninsula divided for
initiatives that
10 3 may ultimately help
far too long.
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